very sensible and rational thing for marketeers to do. Why take chances if you don't have to? Why not take the profit and leave the debts to others as long as you can get away with it? "Nice work if you can get it," according to the words of a popular song in the late 20th century, "and you can get it if you try." The history of the 20th century would suggest that you can get it without even trying, and this concept is also expressed by the title of a very popular play and movie in the late 20th century.
The reader of this review is advised to read the book itself, which is a pleasure to read and full of fascinating historical facts and insights, many of which could not be included in this brief review. The reader might very well come to a conclusion different from those of the author and this reviewer.
That's what history does best: challenge the human imagination! It is almost, if not quite, like an ink blot, into which we can read our heart's desires. Everyone should give it a try. Why let some of us determine what the rest of us will think?
William Eckhardt "SOCIAL SPECTROSCOPY" AND ".LONG CYCLES"
George Modelski, ed., Exploring Long Cycles (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987).
The first paper in this volume is by two of our members, Arthur Iberall and David Wilkinson, "Dynamic Foundations for Complex Systems," and needs to be considered separately from the others. It is mostly an attempt to apply the laws of thermodynamics to civilizational processes. Its major presentation is of a set of "spectroscopic" time scales, that is, proposed time scales on which various human activities occur, and these are useful and interesting ans general background knowledge. The smallest is one-tenth of a second, and is the approximate reaction time that people have to outside events, e.g. to the change of a traffic light while driving. The next eight range from one second to 30-90 days in length and are also part of individual human activity. Various others are longer, but only one, "200-1200 years," is of specific application to problems of civilizational development, and since this ranges over a whole order of magnitude its predicting power is limited. The major weakness of this section is that in civilizational (as against human-biological) terms it is almost entirely hypothetical; there is only one single application to anything approaching a specific civilizational problem. Even this single application is questionable. It concerns activity on the time scale of 3-4 years (p. 31):
For instance, Grant (1985) It may well be that the conclusion is correct, but the datum in evidence is a sum over a total of 507 years, and conditions varied enormously during this period. Thus for example the datum of an average reign of 2'A-5 years conflates the Antonine Age (AD 98-192, five emperors not counting Lucius Verus, for an average tenure of 18.8 years) with the military anarchy (235-284, 23 recognized emperors, for an average tenure of 2.2 years, plus 15 regional claimants of the title, making 38 in all, for an average tenure of 1.3 years). It would require strong evidence to convince the community that the same basic conditions obtained in these two periods, and no evidence at all is presented.
A similar problem obscures the other major topic of this paper, an analysis of the evolution of social science paradigms. This is mostly a refutation of said paradigms from the viewpoint of a physical scientist, and is instructive in that purpose. But again it tends to hypothesize without an adequate exploration of example. For instance, it discusses the question of the place of dialectical materialism in physical science (p. This reviewer, as a historian, is totally unacquainted with any fluid mechanics beyond those involved in washing dishes, but also, as a historian, is experienced in examining questions. Fluid mechanics is held to be "the most obvious potential physical application of dialectics": Beyond the point that fluid mechanics was first formulated in the 1880s, why is it so obvious a candidate for dialectical treatment? Was there ever any attempt at creating a dialectically-oriented fluid mechanics, or for that matter any dialectically-oriented physical science? Presumably the Soviets have their own answers for problems like this; where are they in this discussion? Thus in sum this paper is interesting in principle, and in particular is good conditioning for minds too often buried in the minutiae of single specific events. But it makes so little address of those single specific events that it is extremely difficult for the historian to bridge the gap between his viewpoint and that of the physicist, and such examples as are given need to be given in much greater depth.
The remainder of this volume is a collection of essays revolving around the
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Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 21 [1989], No. 21, Art. 10 https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol21/iss21/10 theory of "long cycles" propounded by George Modelski of the University of Washington. This theory is outlined by Shumpei Kuraon in the paper "Theory of Long Cycles Examined." It is two basic points. The first is that long-lived state systems experience predictable cycles of order and disorder, in which each cycle has four phases lasting some 25 to 30 years each: global war ending in the establishment of hegemony under a world power; world order imposed by the world power; delegitimation of the world power; deconcentration of the world order, with consequent relapse back to global war. The second is that these world powers enforce their position through sea power, so these cycles are reflected in the degree of relative domination of the sea by a single power. The proposed limitations of application of the theory are quite clearly drawn, for example regarding the position of the principal power during the period of world order (p. 197):
This "political basis" does not imply that world leadership is synonymous with world control or world government. Rather, world power leadership is "a system for keeping order at the global level in respect of overall security and global economic relations, but not in respect of all national peculiarities of local administration."
The theory is drawn from study of the European state system during the last 500 years, for which the following analysis is proposed (p. 86):
There are some questions to be raised about various suggestions in this model; Modelski himself notes that the primacy assigned to Portugal during 1518-1609 remains debatable. But even beyond that, this model makes no note of even so drastic a conflict as the Thirty Years' War, which to all practical purposes began right next to the Netherlands in the very first year of the Netherlands' presumed primacy. The war of succession over the duchy of Julich-Cleves (1609-1614) was an effort by the Netherlands and others to prevent the Spanish Hapsburgs from seizing a commanding salient that would dominate both the Netherlands and France, and one may suggest that only the assassination of Henri IV of France prevented the outbreak of a general European war at that moment.
Moving on to the comparativist interests of this Society, the first point to note is that this model is drawn exclusively from the experience of a single civilization, the West, and models drawn from just one source are FIGURE 1. There have been at least three other chronicled periods in world history during which state systems involving multiple members existed continuously for 500 years or more: China 722-221 BC, Greece (expanding into Hellenistic Asia) 700-100 BC, and India 500-1600 AD. Of these, China 722-221 BC has received an intensive analysis of the social effects of warfare which happens to include a year-by-year study of the number and size of wars occurring all through this period. The theory of long cycles implies that state systems should show a distinct pattern of intensity of warfare: 25-30 years of global, presumably therefore very intense, warfare, followed by a sharp dropoff in intensity during 25-30 years of hegemony by a world power, followed by a gradual increase of warfare during the next 50-60 years of gradual decline of order, followed by a spike returning the intensity level to that of global war. Figure II graphs this intensity of warfare for ancient China, reflected in ten-year intervals. It shows no obvious regularity. There is some tendency toward repeated increases and decreases in intensity of warfare, but the pattern is a gradual and interrupted fall followed by a gradual and interrupted rise, not a sudden decline followed by a gradual rise, and shows no relation to the predicted time-lengths of the long cycle. This it would seem that the theory of long cycles is not confirmed by examination of the evolution of a state system in a different civilization. The figure is in two parts, because Hsu periodized his data according to tradition, into the Ch'un-ch-iu and Chan-kuo periods, (dividing in 481 BC). This is a literary demarcation, based on the cut-off date of one particular work (the Ch'un-ch'iu, the Spring and Autumn Annals of the State of Lu), and has nothing to do with the subject under consideration. However, speaking in general, "Chan Kuo wars not only lasted longer but took place on a much larger scale than Ch'un Ch'iu conflicts"; one table notes the casualties reportedly inflicted by Ch'in in various Chan-kuo batdes, and the figures vary from 7,000 to 450,000, with seven of the eleven reported casualty totals varying between 20,000 and 80,000 (three higher, one lower, with no obvious pattern of growth or diminishment). "The 'war score' is calculated as follows: In any single campaign each of the thirteen major powers [Ch'un-ch'iu period] / seven major powers [Chan-kuo period] is computed as one point, while each small state involved is computed as one-half point." [Hsu 1965:56,64-57] The first two entries in the Chan-kuo graph come from Hsu's Ch'un-ch'iu figures, and so may be artificially high as compared to the others. The last entry (of "10") covers only the two yers of Ch'in's final sweep to empire; adjusted to the standard ten-year interval, this would be a "50"-but then, there was no one left to fight with.
Looking next at individual papers, Modelski's "A System Model of the Long Cycle" is a discussion of feedback patterns in a cyclical development and David Rapkin's "World Leadership" outlines theoretical considerations on that point. Both are interesting and should be examined by scholars researching those subjects. The remaining papers are heavily oriented toward economics, either using an economic model to analyze the development of long cycles (George Modelski and William R. Thompson, "Testing Cobweb Models of the Long Cycle") or using the long cycle model to analyze economic developments (Daniel Pearson, "The Global Economic Order of the Eighteenth Century", Suzanne Y. Frederick, "The Instability of Free Trade"). Pearson's paper in particular is an interesting comparison of the predictions of long-cycle theory with those made by hegemonic-stability theory, and should be read by all scholars who are creating and testing models of civilizational development. Indeed, while Modelski insists on the essentially separate though interacting nature of political and economic events, the long-cycle model seems much more convincing on the development of economic systems than it is on the problem of political order and disorder, and theoreticians of macroeonomic development should study it carefully. Overall, the book is recommended for university libraries and for the personal shelves of scholars with the particular interests noted above.
John K. Hard

CORRESPONDENCE
Reply by Modelski:
Thank you for letting me see your forthcoming review of Exploring Long Cycles. It is a fair review. However, there is a point arising out of it, and it is a basic one concerning the framework of the project, that needs to be stated.
It has to do with how we view the evolution of the social organization of mankind. I see it in McNeill's terms as the growth of one human community and not, as Toynbee saw it, as the rise of a multitude of distinct civilizations. The long cycle, therefore, is not a process of "western civilization" but rather that of a new era of the world system, the modern era, one characteristic of which has been the formation, since about 1500, of a global network whose functioning exhibits cyclical (as well as evolutionary) features.
The modern world is structurally different from the systems of the
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Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 21 [1989], No. 21, Art. 10 https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol21/iss21/10 classical era in respect of size, complexity, and specialization. The classical world had no global network; hence it could not have had any cycles of global politics. That is why the theory does not predict any simple correspondences and does not call for tests against classical experience. I should therefore have preferred the label for Figure 1 to read "The long cycle of the modern global political system" as it is on p. 86 from which you draw it. Better still, you might want to use the enclosed table that is based on the more recent "evolutionary learning" model.
If I were to look at the Chinese case you cite, I might note that it is a much simpler one, and relabel it a regional system. I would certainly expect fluctuations to appear in its working, but looking at the structures of leadership first, I would hesitate to draw conclusions solely from the number of actors participating in warfare. The dynamic involved is that of the formation of a classical empire, and does not hold lessons for the modern world.
Periodic Table of Surrebuttal by Hord: This emphasis on globalism makes three assumptions, first that the world post-1500 was qualitatively different from the world before 1500, second that this difference was of such kind as to affect drastically the interstate relations within the state system, and third that there were no changes in size, complexity, and specialization after ca. 1500 that would constitute another such structural change in the nature of the system. This last looks particularly questionable; one may suggest that the world of the later nineteenth century was much more evolved in terms of size, complexity, and specialization than that of the eighteenth century, much less the sixteenth century, and that a similarly major structural change has occurred in our own times. 1500 is a traditional line of division in Western history, but this is an American-centered tradition resting primarily on that "in 1492 the world discovered us!" Globalization itself was not a single event but a process that required centuries before completion. There were other important developments at this time, such as the printing press and the Protestant secession. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 even affected the character of the Western political system. But I am unaware of any developments that so changed the Western state system as to introduce an entirely new mechanic into its workings. Modelski emphasizes sea power, but sea power had been working around the Mediterranean for at least eight centuries before this time, in an intensive interaction among the Western, Byzantine, and Muslim civilizations. One may note that 1500 was the effective date of the beginning of colonialism, but only one of the European world wars was decided in the colonies (the War of the American Revolution, decided by the battles of Yorktown and the Saintes). Of course it may be that Modelski has justified these assumptions elsewhere.
Rejoinder by Modelski: Let me say in reply that, in an evolutionary perspective, the basic break between the classical and the modern world lies around AD 1000; the period between 1000 and 1500 might best be termed one of gestation of the modern world system. The years around 1500 are important because they mark the birth (by a process of differentiation) of two new structures: the nation-states and the global system, both based initially on Western Europe but not inherently "Western". What is called the "Western state system" is the f amiliar nation-state system that arose at the same time and as part of the same process of globalization.
The mechanism of globalization was oceanic seapower. True, (coasthugging) sea-power was familiar in the Mediterranean and we must not ignore the Indian Ocean and China seas either. But 1500 was a clean break (in the West) between the earlier galleys and the new sailing ships armed with artillery and new navigational software, now circling the globe (cf. Modelski & Thompson 1988 , Sea Power in Global Politics 1494 -1993 . It does not mean the start of colonialism though; that too was common in the Mediterranean for many centuries, most immediately prior to that date in the practices of Genoa and Venice. In sum, while 1500 is not a "catastrophic fold line", it does mark the birth of two critical modern structures.
